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Introduction
Combining forecasts is a well-established and powerful 
method to increase forecast accuracy (Armstrong, 2001; 
Clemen, 1989). The reason is that a combined forecast 
includes more information than forecasts from any single 
component method. In addition, the systematic and random 
errors associated with individual component forecasts are 
likely to cancel out in the combined forecast.
As has been demonstrated with the PollyVote for pre-
dicting US presidential elections, combining forecasts is 
particularly beneficial if one can draw on component fore-
casts that use different methods and data. The PollyVote 
averages forecasts within and across four different compo-
nent methods: polls, prediction markets, quantitative mod-
els, and expert judgment. Across the six elections from 
1992 to 2012, the resulting combined forecast reduced the 
error of a typical poll, model, and expert judgment by more 
than half. Compared with prediction markets, the most 
accurate component method, error was reduced by 16% 
(Graefe et al., 2014b). Forecasts made on Election Eve 
prior to the three elections from 2004 to 2012 missed the 
final vote share on average by 0.6 percentage points. To put 
this in perspective, the average error of the final Gallup poll 
was more than three times higher (Graefe et al., 2014a).
This performance was achieved even though the 
PollyVote did not include forecasts from vote expectation 
surveys, also known as ‘citizen forecasts’, which were 
recently shown to provide highly accurate forecasts of US 
presidential election outcomes (Graefe, 2014). These sur-
veys simply ask respondents whom they expect to win.1 
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In averaging forecasts within and across four-component methods (i.e. polls, prediction markets, expert judgment and 
quantitative models), the combined PollyVote provided highly accurate predictions for the US presidential elections from 
1992 to 2012. This research note shows that the PollyVote would have also outperformed vote expectation surveys, 
which prior research identified as the most accurate individual forecasting method during that time period. Adding vote 
expectations to the PollyVote would have further increased the accuracy of the combined forecast. Across the last 
90 days prior to the six elections, a five-component PollyVote (i.e. including vote expectations) would have yielded a 
mean absolute error of 1.08 percentage points, which is 7% lower than the corresponding error of the original four-
component PollyVote. This study thus provides empirical evidence in support of two major findings from forecasting 
research. First, combining forecasts provides highly accurate predictions, which are difficult to beat for even the most 
accurate individual forecasting method available. Second, the accuracy of a combined forecast can be improved by 
adding component forecasts that rely on different data and different methods than the forecasts already included in the 
combination.
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The aggregate responses are then used as a forecast of who 
will win the election. If data on historical elections are 
available, the aggregate responses can also be translated to 
popular vote-share forecasts using simple linear regression 
(Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2011; Lewis-Beck and Tien, 
1999).
Vote expectation surveys have been around at least as 
long as scientific polling (Hayes, 1936), but have long been 
overlooked as a method for forecasting election outcomes. 
Although early work pointed to the accuracy of vote expec-
tations, these studies focused on identifying factors that 
explain why most citizens are able to accurately predict 
election outcomes (e.g. Lewis-Beck and Skalaban, 1989; 
Lewis-Beck and Tien, 1999). Only recently have research-
ers begun to specifically study vote expectation surveys as 
a method for forecasting elections (Lewis-Beck and 
Stegmaier, 2011; Murr, 2011, 2014).
In a previous study, I compared the accuracy of vote 
expectations to forecasts from polls, prediction markets, 
quantitative models, and expert judgment (Graefe, 2014). 
Across the last 100 days prior to the seven US presidential 
elections from 1988 to 2012, vote expectations provided 
more accurate forecasts of election winners and vote shares 
than each of the four established methods. Compared with 
polls, vote expectations reduced the error of vote-share pre-
dictions by 51%. Compared with prediction markets, error 
was reduced by 6%. In other words, vote expectation sur-
veys appear to be the most accurate individual method for 
forecasting US presidential elections available to date.
The present research note builds on this work and con-
tributes to knowledge on combining forecasts by analysing 
(1) the relative accuracy of vote expectations and the 
PollyVote and (2) the accuracy gains from adding vote 
expectations to the PollyVote.
Method and data
Accuracy is analysed for forecasts of the national two-party 
popular vote in the six US presidential elections from 1992 
to 2012, the time period for which forecast data on both the 
PollyVote and vote expectation surveys are available. The 
absolute error, calculated as the absolute difference of the 
predicted and actual national two-party popular vote of the 
incumbent party’s candidate, was used as the measure of 
accuracy.
Forecasts from the original four-component PollyVote 
and vote expectations were obtained from publicly availa-
ble datasets at the Harvard Dataverse Network. These data-
sets provide daily forecasts of the national two-party 
popular vote for each of the six US presidential elections 
from 1992 to 2012.2 From these data, a new set of daily 
forecasts was calculated by adding vote expectations as a 
fifth component method to the original PollyVote. That is, 
this new (five-component) PollyVote was computed by 
averaging forecasts across five (instead of four) component 
methods: (1) polls, (2) prediction markets, (3) quantitative 
models, (4) expert judgment, and (5) vote expectations. For 
more information on the calculation of the original 
PollyVote see Graefe et al. (2014b). All data and calcula-
tions are available at the Harvard Dataverse Network.3
Results
Figure 1 shows the mean absolute errors (MAE) of fore-
casts from vote expectations, the original PollyVote (with-
out vote expectations), and the new PollyVote (including 
vote expectations) across the six elections from 1992 to 
2012. Vote expectations were less accurate than the original 
























Days to Election Day
New PollyVote (including vote expectations)
Original PollyVote (without vote expectations)
Vote expectations
Figure 1. Mean absolute errors of forecasts from vote expectations, the original PollyVote (without vote expectations) and the 
new PollyVote (with vote expectations), 1992–2012.
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Day) and short-term forecasts (from 20 days prior to 
Election Day). For medium-term forecasts (60–20 days), 
however, vote expectations performed similar to – and 
sometimes better than – the original PollyVote.
Figure 1 further shows that adding vote expectations to 
the original PollyVote increases accuracy. Except for long-
term forecasts, the new five-component PollyVote provides 
at least as – and usually more – accurate forecasts as the 
original four-component PollyVote.
Figure 2 presents the same data in a different way by 
showing the MAE of vote expectations and both PollyVote 
versions across the remaining days in the forecast horizon. 
That is, at any given day, the chart depicts the average error 
that one would have achieved by picking one of the three 
methods and relying on its forecast until Election Day. For 
example, if one had relied on the vote expectation forecasts 
starting 90 days before the election, an average error of 
1.32 percentage points would have resulted. In comparison, 
the corresponding error of the original PollyVote would 
have been 12% lower (1.16 percentage points). In general, 
the gains in accuracy by relying on the PollyVote rather 
than vote expectations tend to increase as the election 
comes closer. Furthermore, Figure 2 demonstrates the ben-
efit of adding vote expectations, as the error of the new 
(five-component) PollyVote was consistently lower than 
the error of the original (four-component) PollyVote. For 
example, starting 90 days prior to Election Day, the MAE 
of the new PollyVote was 1.08, which is 7% lower than the 
corresponding error of the original PollyVote.
Discussion
This research note provides empirical evidence in support 
of two major findings from the forecasting literature. First, 
combining forecasts from different methods that use differ-
ent data provides highly accurate forecasts, which are dif-
ficult to beat by even the most accurate individual method 
available. Across the past 90 days prior to each of the six 
elections from 1992 to 2012, the original PollyVote – which 
averages forecasts within and across polls, prediction mar-
kets, quantitative models, and expert judgment, but does 
not include vote expectations – missed the incumbent par-
ty’s final vote share on average by 1.16 percentage points. 
This error is 12% lower than the corresponding error of 
vote expectation surveys, which prior research found to the 
most accurate method for the examined time period (Graefe, 
2014).
Second, and more importantly, the accuracy of a com-
bined forecast can be further improved by adding compo-
nent forecasts that rely on a different method and different 
data than the forecasts already included in the combination. 
After adding vote expectations as a fifth component 
method, the new PollyVote reduced the error of the original 
four-component version by 7%, a substantial improvement 
given the already very low forecast error. On average across 
the 90 days prior to the six elections, the new five- 
component PollyVote missed the final election result by lit-
tle more than one (i.e. 1.08) percentage point.
This performance was achieved by calculating simple 
unweighted averages within and across forecasts of five 
component methods. Calculating unweighted averages 
may appear as a naïve approach to combining forecasts, as 
it does not account for the component methods’ relative 
accuracy. However, an early review of more than 200 
papers showed that the simple average provides a good 
starting point for combining forecasts, and is difficult to 
beat by more complex approaches (Clemen, 1989). These 
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Figure 2. Mean absolute error of forecasts from vote expectations, the original PollyVote (without vote expectations) and the 
new PollyVote (including vote expectations), calculated across the remaining day to election, 1992–2012.
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sophisticated methods for combining. The problem with 
complex statistical procedures that aim to estimate compo-
nent weights from historical data is that they tend to per-
form poorly in situations with limited and messy data, 
which are common in the social sciences. A recent example 
is Ensemble Bayesian Model Averaging (EBMA), a method 
that has been shown to perform well for combining fore-
casts in the data-heavy domain of weather forecasting. 
However, when applied to problems with scarce and noisy 
data, such as in economic and election forecasting, EBMA 
provided less accurate forecasts than the simple equal-
weights average (Graefe et al., 2015).
When pre-specifying equal weights to component fore-
casts, analysts ignore the components’ relative accuracy. 
Instead, they deliberately introduce a bias that reduces vari-
ance and thereby limits a model’s ability to explain given 
data. At the same time, however, lower variance avoids the 
danger of overfitting a model to historical data. Thus, low 
variance can be beneficial when predicting new data, in 
particular, in situations that involve much uncertainty. In 
statistical theory, this relationship is known as the bias–
variance tradeoff (Hastie et al., 2001).
When forecasting presidential elections, for example, 
uncertainty occurs due to ambiguity about the component 
methods’ relative accuracy, external shocks (e.g. campaign 
events), or the existence of noisy data. Calculating 
unweighted averages across forecasts is a simple way to 
account for such uncertainties or, in other words, to incor-
porate prior knowledge that prediction in the situation at 
hand is difficult.
Differential weights can be useful if there is strong prior 
knowledge about the methods’ relative accuracy. For exam-
ple, polls are well known to have little predictive value until 
shortly before the election (Erikson and Wlezien, 2012). 
Thus, it might be useful to assign lower weights to polls 
early in the campaign and then gradually increase their 
weight as the election comes closer, an approach that is 
becoming standard practice in models that combine struc-
tural (fundamental) data and updated polls over time. For a 
review of existing models see Lewis-Beck and Dassonneville 
(2015), who also incorporate this prior knowledge about the 
relative accuracy of polls over time to develop forecasting 
models for French, German, and UK elections.
While combining is most powerful when aggregating 
many forecasts that use a different method and different 
data, the approach can also be used if fewer methods are 
available. In a recent study, combining forecasts from three 
methods (a quantitative model, prediction markets, and 
polls) yielded accurate predictions of the 2012 US Electoral 
College and senatorial elections, a situation in which data 
are scarce (Rothschild, 2014).
Finally, the benefits of combining are of course not lim-
ited to US elections. In a recent validation test, the PollyVote 
was used to predict vote shares of seven parties in the 2013 
German federal election by averaging forecasts within and 
across the four-component methods that were used in the 
original US PollyVote. Across the 58 days for which fore-
casts from all four components were available, the com-
bined PollyVote forecast was more accurate than each 
component’s typical forecast. Error reductions ranged from 
5%, compared with a typical poll, to 41%, compared with a 
typical prediction market (Graefe, 2015).
Conclusion
Since 2004, the PollyVote has demonstrated the benefits of 
combining for forecasting the national vote in US presiden-
tial elections by averaging forecasts from four-component 
methods. Combining is a simple and powerful strategy to 
generate accurate forecasts. Combining forecasts from dif-
ferent component methods typically yields more accurate 
predictions than the average (i.e. randomly selected) com-
ponent, and often outperforms even the best component. 
Adding forecasts that use a different method and different 
data to the combination can be expected to further improve 
accuracy. Given the results of the present research note, the 
PollyVote will add vote expectations as a fifth component 
for forecasting the 2016 US presidential election.
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Notes
1. For example, “Regardless of whom you support, and trying 
to be objective as possible, who do you think will win the 
presidential election in November (2008)–Barack Obama or 
John McCain?” Gallup Poll, October 23–26, 2008.
2. The PollyVote data are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/
DVN/23184. The vote expectations data are available at http://
dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/VOTEEXPECTATIONSURVEYS.
3. The data and calculations for the present research note are 
available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/27967.
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